Anonymous MD0034, Anonymous MD0034

Page 1 of 1

Withholds Support for NBAF On Feb. 19, the same day that have of Homeland Security (DHS) officials held an letter.) A third condition: "explain plans for informational meeting in Athens to answer keeping sediment runoff from the facility out citizens' additional questions about the proof Falls Lake." Also desired are information on posed National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility oversight and consideration of alternate sites (NBAF), a group of elected officials not far in North Carolina. from another possible NBAF site—the city When asked about the city council vote in council of Raleigh, NC-voted unanimously Raleigh, Athens-Clarke Mayor Heidi Davison had only to say what she's already said about to withhold their support for siting NBAF in the nearby town of Butner. Butner is about 30 NBAF in recent weeks: that she will continue miles north of Raleigh, to support the project and is not far upstream of "Council members said until she has informa-Raleigh's sole water-suption that will change her ply reservoir, Falls Lake. they want federal officials mind. In other words, she The Raleigh City plans to give Homeland to meet five conditions Council doesn't have Security's Environmental jurisdiction over Butner before they could consider Impact Statement, or Ei. or over the county a "proper review" when it supporting the facility." (Granville) in which is released. In that sense, Butner is located, but in her support for NBAF is their vote last week Raleigh officials did lend conditional in essentially the same way that support to the Granville County Commission, Raleigh's opposition to the project is. Davison reiterated that the NBAF proposal will not be which earlier withdrew its support for NBAF. debated by ACC Commissioners "on the floor," According to a press release, "Council memand that they will not be expected to take forbers said they want federal officials to meet five conditions before they could consider mal action on the matter. supporting the facility." A 60-day window for public comment will Those conditions include responding follow the release of Homeland Security's draft to questions posed by Granville County EIS in late spring. The final EIS is expected Commissioners, as well as those posed by in late summer or fall, and it likely will be Raleigh officials as a part of the scoping proaccompanied by a final site decision by cess in a letter sent to DHS last fall. (A list of Homeland Security officials. nearly 40 questions ranging from water supply and wastewater treatment to emergency NEWS & FEATURES | CALENDAR | MOVIES | A&E | MUSIC | COMICS 1| 27.0

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 27.0 DHS notes the information submitted by the commentor.

Anonymous MD0036, Anonymous MD0036


Page 1 of 1

MD0036 LETTERS TO THE EDITOR **Locating NBAF in Athens** would come at great cost As a Tuesday letter to the editor contended, opposition to siting the proposed National Bioand Agro-Defense Facility in Athens-Clarke County should be focused on local decision-makers, because the majority of area citizens didn't consent to any invitation to the federal Department of Homeland Security to locate potential pestilence in our midst. Homeowners should be duly concerned, and not because of alarmists, but because of evidence. Politicians have tried to ignore genuine concerns with the hope that critics would just go away. Many people, legitimately concerned about the slow local economy, are tempted by golden promises regarding NBAF. The spectacle of seeing academics losing objectivity through exagger-ation about NBAF, and favoring secrecy, hasn't been pretty to watch. One need not go beyond statements within the Draft Environmental Impact Statement released by DHS that indicate wildlife, vegetation, agricul? ture and human populations provide ample opportunity for viruses to spread rapidly in the event of a release. Mosquitoes infected with pathogenic organisms could lead to a "permanent reservoir of virus." According to the draft statement, NBAF would be safer for animal and human populations if located offshore - particularly at Plum Island, N.Y. Local NBAF proponents point to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta as 1| 27.0 an example of a safe research facility. Recent news stories, however, have exposed problems with power outages and air leaks. In addition, estimates of water consumption at NBAF have grown from 28,000 gallons per day to 43 million gallons per year. What will hap-pen to property values in the Athens area when possible threats to safety are added to drought conditions? While there is no doubt NBAF construction and employment eventually would bring money to the area, the requirements for infrastructure additions and changes inevitably would require an unknown, immediate increase in taxation. Economic and academic enhancements should

be pursued when they are in the best interests of our wonderful community. But how many risks, and what costs, must be borne by a community, in pursuit of illusory benefits? Clearly, the NBAF proposal is one best left on the doorstep. Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 27.0 DHS notes the information submitted by the commentor.

Anonymous MD0042, Anonymous MD0042


Page 1 of 1



Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.2 DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Anonymous MD0084, Anonymous MD0084

Page 1 of 1



Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.3 DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

2-73 December 2008

Anonymous MD0126, Anonymous MD0126

Page 1 of 2

MD0126

AG disparages Plum Island option

Today

1| 27.0

Attorney General Richard Blumenthal has filed formal comments with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, outlining alleged inadequacies in a draft environmental impact statement on a proposed federal National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility on Plum Island.

Plum Island, eight miles off the Connecticut shore, is one of six sites targeted by the federal government for a proposed Level 4 NBAF, the highest security designation, that would allow study of some of the deadliest biological threats to humans. Plum Island now operates as a Level 3 facility involving only animal-to-animal pathogens.

Blumenthal said the federal government's draft environmental impact statement is "profoundly deficient, and legally insufficient," failing to fully consider the overwhelming risks of this facility, in violation of the National Environmental Policy Act.

Blumenthal said Plum Island should be immediately removed from the list of considered sites.

"Although Plum Island has long hosted research into animal disease, the new facility would take the public health threat literally to a new level," Blumenthal said in a statement. "The environmental security risks are intolerable in an area so densely populated, heavily traveled and environmentally valued. The threat of accident or attack is hardly hypothetical or speculative, as recent experience has taught to our sorrow. These dangers are real and substantial, and have not been adequately considered."

8/21/2008


Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 27.0

DHS notes the information provided by the commentor.

2-74 December 2008

Anonymous MD0126, Anonymous MD0126

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2-75 December 2008

Anonymous MSD005, Anonymous MSD005

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
OEPARTMA TO	National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility Draft Environmental Impact Statement
NATIONAL BIO AND AGRO-DEFENSE FACILITY Science and Technology Directorate/Office of National Laboratories	Personal information is optional as this document is part of the public record and may be reproduced in its entirety in the final National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility Environmental impact Statement. Name: Title: Organization: Address: City: State: Zip Code: Comments: Massissippi is a great plan of this faulety Madison (ounty to a great plant to lune it washe. Erect softgals, weather, it People are friendly. We suchious fau. The "Ineduceti" assignment for the "view", is in the lyes of the beholder. The feet punt in The fullding bands fit well here. We love Prominent fullding it fauls here. We love Prominent fullding it fauls here. We love Strenders who could love also and bislontisel
	Transgemeinsetts etco ARS also has a party (Continued on back for your convenience)

Comment No: 1	Issue Code: 24.5			
DHS notes the commentor's support for the Flora Industrial Park Site Alternative.				

2-76 December 2008

Anonymous MSD005, Anonymous MSD005

Page 2 of 2



Anonymous NCD018, Anonymous NCD018

Page 1 of 1

	NBAF QUESTION – PLEASE, ONE QUESTION PER CARD NCD018
To	Assist the facilitator, please indicate the topic of your question: Accidents, threats or risk
Qι	uestion:
	When asked - A number of times the - About the possibility of
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Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 2.0

DHS's mission is to study foreign animal and zoonotic (transmitted from animals to humans) diseases that threaten our agricultural livestock and agricultural economy. The purpose of the NBAF would be to develop tests to detect foreign animal and zoonotic diseases and develop vaccines (or other countermeasures such as antiviral therapies) to protect agriculture and food systems in the United States. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that future work would be conducted on strictly human pathogens.

2-78 December 2008

Anonymous NCD022, Anonymous NCD022

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TAND SEC	Draft Environmental Impact Statement Comment Form Personal information is optional as this document is part of the public record and may be reproduced in its entirety in the final National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility Environmental Impact Statement. Name:
LITY	Title: home owner, landowner Organization:
FACILIT Laboratories	Address:
AND AGRO-DEFENSE gy Dire 15gare/Office Privational	greatly lowering property values, this lab endangers livestock and the pative animals in our area. Would You like to live near this
NATIONAL BIO AND Science and Technology Dire	
NA S	

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.1

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative in favor of the Plum Island Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 21.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding property values. There is no empirical evidence that a facility such as the NBAF would reduce property values in the study area.

DHS notes the commentors conern about local livestock and animals. The NBAF would provide state-of-the-art operating procedures and biocontainment features to minimize the potential for laboratory-acquired infections and accidental releases. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF then site-specific protocols and emergency response plans would be developed, in coordination with local emergency response agencies that would consider the diversity and density of human, livestock, and wildlife populations residing within the area. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the NBAF. Section 3.8.9 of the NBAF EIS addresses existing and potentially applicable response plans that provide insight into some of the livestock and wildlife protective and mitigating measures that could be employed in the event of a pathogen release from the NBAF.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

2-79 December 2008

Anonymous PD0008, Anonymous PD0008

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PD0008

July 4, 2008

1 | 25.4 | I think it's absolutely ludicrous to put the BSL-4 land in tornado alley Kansas or cattle country Texas. Keep it right on Plum Island where it's been safe, and that's the only 3 | 24.1 | place to put it.

Thank you.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding potential tornado impacts to the NBAF. The NBAF would be designed to withstand the normal meteorological conditions that are present within the geographic area of the selected site. The basis for establishing the anticipated wind speeds were the International Building Code, ASCE 7 and the local jurisdictions. However, because of code specified building importance modification factors and normal factors of safety incorporated into the structural design, the facility would resist wind pressures up to 170% of the code specified 50-year wind pressures. This means the building's structural system could resist a wind speed that is expected to occur, on the average, only once in a 500 year period.

In the unlikely event that a 500-year wind storm strikes the facility, the exterior walls and roofing of the building would likely fail first, and this breach in the exterior skin would cause a dramatic increase in internal pressures leading to further failure of the building's interior and exterior walls. The loss of these architectural wall components would decrease the overall wind loading applied to the building and therefore diminish the possibility of damage to the building's primary structural system. Even with the failure of these interior and exterior wall systems under an extreme wind loading event, the robust construction used to construct BSL-3Ag and BSL-4 spaces, reinforced cast-in-place concrete walls, would resist these wind forces and the primary bio-containment envelope would not be breached. The containment walls will be designed to withstand a 200 mph wind load, which is equivalent to an F3 tornado according to the FEMA Design and Construction Guidance for Community Shelters standards.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 25.6

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Texas Research Park Site Alternative. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS investigate the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents, DHS cannot guarantee that the NBAF would never experience an accident; however, the risk of an accidental release of a pathogen from the NBAF is extremely low. The economic impact of an accidental release, including the impact on the livestock-related industries, is presented in Section 3.10.9 and Appendix D. The major economic effect from an accidental release of a pathogen would be a potential ban on all U.S. livestock products until the country was determined to be disease-free.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 24.1

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Plum Island Site Alternative.

2-80 December 2008

Anonymous PD0009, Anonymous PD0009

Page 1 of 1

PD0009 July 5, 2008 Hi, I just want you to know I am a , and I live in very beautiful and rural town in north Georgia, and we are opposed to the bio terror lab. We think that it will not only be a visual nuisance, but is also not in the best interest of 3 15.2 the Athens area, and the community, and the students as well. 4| 25.0 | The effect that it has on the environment, the school systems nearby, the water usage -5 | 15.2 | we are very opposed to it and will do everything in our power to try and get a different , location for the lab because we do not want it in Athens. 7| 25.2 Thanks.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 7.2

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the visual effects of the NBAF which are described in Section 3.2 of the NBAF EIS. DHS recognizes that the NBAF would be a distictive visible feature and would alter the visual aesthetics of the area.

NBAF Final Environmental Impact Statement

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 15.2

DHS notes the commentor's concern of effects in school systems. The effects on the community including schools are discussed in Section 3.10. The effects to schools and other quality of life resources would be minimal, since the number of new employees from the NBAF would be between 250 and 350, most of which would relocate from outside of the region.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 25.0

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the NBAF.

Comment No: 5 Issue Code: 15.2

DHS notes the commentor's concern. Adverse effects to quality-of-life resources would not be expected with any of the site alternatives and are discussed in Section 3.10 of the NBAF EIS.

Comment No: 6 Issue Code: 12.2

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the proposed water use and existing water supply. Section 3.3 includes an evaluation of infrastructure including potable water, and Section 3.7 includes an evaluation of water resources. As stated in Section 3.3.3.3.1, there is adequate capacity of 43,000,000 gallons per year, but some infrastructure improvements would be required. DHS acknowledges that drought conditions exist in the region, but the NBAF would only account for a minor increase in water use compared to recent development trends.

Comment No: 7 Issue Code: 25.2

Please see response to Comment No. 1.

2-81 December 2008

Anonymous PD0011, Anonymous PD0011

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PD0011

July 9, 2008

1| 5.0 I found that the Government Accountability Office has stated that the National Bio and Agro Defense Facility is best put on an island. And being a native Kansan, and having had tornados of magnitude 5 wipe out the town of Green, and actually hit a Kansas State University, I find that it is very unsafe to have that facility built in a university town in Kansas. And so, I am against having that facility built in Kansas.

Thank you.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives. It has been shown that modern biosafety laboratories can be safely operated in populated areas. An example is the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in downtown Atlanta, Georgia, where such facilities employ modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of NBAF.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding potential tornado impacts to the NBAF. The NBAF would be designed to withstand the normal meteorological conditions that are present within the geographic area of the selected site. The basis for establishing the anticipated wind speeds were the International Building Code, ASCE 7 and the local jurisdictions. However, because of code specified building importance modification factors and normal factors of safety incorporated into the structural design, the facility would resist wind pressures up to 170% of the code specified 50-year wind pressures. This means the building's structural system could resist a wind speed that is expected to occur, on the average, only once in a 500 year period.

In the unlikely event that a 500-year wind storm strikes the facility, the exterior walls and roofing of the building would likely fail first, and this breach in the exterior skin would cause a dramatic increase in internal pressures leading to further failure of the building's interior and exterior walls. The loss of these architectural wall components would decrease the overall wind loading applied to the building and therefore diminish the possibility of damage to the building's primary structural system. Even with the failure of these interior and exterior wall systems under an extreme wind loading event, the robust construction used to construct BSL-3Ag and BSL-4 spaces, reinforced cast-in-place concrete walls, would resist these wind forces and the primary bio-containment envelope would not be breached. The containment walls will be designed to withstand a 200 mph wind load, which is equivalent to an F3 tornado according to the FEMA Design and Construction Guidance for Community Shelters standards.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

2-82 December 2008

Anonymous PD0012, Anonymous PD0012

Page 1 of 1

PD0012 July 9, 2008 Hi, Georgia. I'm a private citizen, not connected with anything, but I am totally opposed to having this site here. Plum Island is a much safer site. I fear for myself and my family. More than that, we are in a serious, serious drought. We can't even flush our toilets. We're restricted with 3 12.2 outdoor watering and using our washing machines, etc. The NBAF will need 118,000 gallons of water a day. They will be robbing the citizens of Athens daily water. 1 cont. | 25.2 | Please don't come here. We do not want you.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 24.1

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site in favor of the Plum Island Site Alternative.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 12.2

DHS notes the commentor's drought concerns and acknowledges current regional drought conditions. As described in Section 3.7.3.3.1 of the NBAF EIS, the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative would use approximately 118,000 gallons per day of potable water, an amount that is approximately 0.76% of Athens' current annual average of 15.5 million gallons per day usage. The NBAF annual potable water usage is expected to be approximately equivalent to the amount consumed by 228 residential homes.

2-83 December 2008

Anonymous PD0013, Anonymous PD0013

Page 1 of 1

	PD0013
	July 9, 2008
25.4	I'm from Kansas, and I'd like to say that I oppose bringing the NBAF to the KSU campus.
	I do not think it is a safe place to have this facility.
	Thank you.
	Bye.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.4 DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

2-84 December 2008

Anonymous PD0014, Anonymous PD0014

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PD0014

July 9, 2008

Hello,

1 25.2 I'm calling because I'm opposed to your having the site here in Athens, Georgia. My friends are opposed. My family is opposed. I'm sure you'll be hearing from them too.

Even David Lee of the University of Georgia, who was gungho on having it here, has said that he favors building the facility on Plum Island because that is safer than having it here in Athens, Georgia.

2 | 19.2 I live way too close to that facility. I don't want me or my 3 | 13.2 family or the wildlife at Botanical Gardens harmed in any way.

4| 12.2 3 cont.| 13.2 1 cont.| 25.2

Thank you for your time.

1 cont. 25.2 We do not want you here.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 19.2

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding the proximity of the NBAF to residential areas. The NBAF would be designed, constructed, and operated to ensure the maximum level of public safety and to fulfill all necessary requirements to protect the environment. As described in Chapter 3 and summarized in Section 2.5 of the NBAF EIS, the impacts of activities during normal operations at any of the six site alternatives would likely be minor. Section 3.14 investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents, Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF then site specific protocols would be developed, in coordination with local emergency response agencies. These protocols would address emergency response considerations for populations residing within close proximity to the NBAF.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 13.2

DHS notes the commentors concern regarding the proximity of the site to the Botanical Garden. As indicated in Sections 3.8.3.2 and 3.8.3.3 of the NBAF EIS EIS, construction and normal operations of the NBAF would have no direct impact on the State Botanical Garden. The NBAF would affect primarily pasture areas that have low wildlife habitat value due to their disturbed condition, lack of native vegetation, and lack of wildlife food and cover. The forested portion of the NBAF site along the Oconee River is a high value riparian wildlife corridor that connects the Botanical Garden with Whitehall Forest. However, impacts to the forested riparian area would be minor (0.2 acre), and these impacts would occur within the existing pasture fence-line in areas that have been disturbed by grazing. The high value riparian corridor would be preserved; and therefore, the proposed NBAF would not have significant direct impacts on wildlife. The potential impacts of an accidental release on wildlife are addressed in Section 3.8.9. Although the EIS acknowledges the potential for significant wildlife impacts in the event of an accidental release, the risk of such a release is extremely low (see Section 3.14). It has been shown that modern biosafety laboratories can be safely operated in populated areas and in areas with abundant wildlife. State-of-the-art biocontainment facilities such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in downtown Atlanta, Georgia, employ modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of NBAF. Furthermore, the purpose of NBAF is to combat diseases that could have significant effects on wildlife. Research at the NBAF would include the development of vaccines for wildlife that could prevent adverse impacts from a foreign introduction. DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding safe facility operations. The NBAF would be designed, constructed, and operated to ensure the maximum level of public safety and to

2-85 December 2008

fulfill all necessary requirements to protect the environment. An analysis of potential consequences of a pathogen (e.g., Rift Valley fever virus) becoming established in native mosquito populations, particularly in warm, humid climates, was evaluated in Sections 3.8.9, 3.10.9, and 3.14.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 12.2

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the proposed water use and existing water supply. Section 3.3 of the NBAF EIS includes an evaluation of infrastructure including potable water, and Section 3.7 includes an evaluation of water resources. As stated in Section 3.3.3.3.1, there is adequate capacity of 43,000,000 gallons per year, but some infrastructure improvements would be required. DHS notes the commentor's drought concerns and acknowledges current regional drought conditions. As described in Section 3.7.3.3.1, the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative would use approximately 118,000 gallons per day of potable water, an amount that is approximately 0.76% of Athens' current annual average of 15.5 million gallons per day usage. The NBAF annual potable water usage is expected to be approximately equivalent to the amount consumed by 228 residential homes.

2-86 December 2008

Anonymous PD0016, Anonymous PD0016

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PD0016

July 17, 2008

Yes,

We have about 20 people in the community that raised cane when the federal prison came in and tried to scare everybody to death and they're the same people that are trying to do the same thing with your outfit.

God bless you.

Thank you.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.3

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.


Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 15.3

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative. The economic effects of the NBAF at the Umstead Research Farm Site are included in Section 3.10.7 of the NBAF EIS. During the 4-yr construction phase, total labor income is projected at approximately \$162 million (Section 3.10.7.2.1) while operation of the NBAF would generate approximately \$29 million (Section 3.10.7.3.1) in labor income annually.

2-87 December 2008

Anonymous PD0019, Anonymous PD0019

Page 1 of 1



Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 12.2

DHS notes the commentor's drought concerns and acknowledges current regional drought conditions. As described in Section 3.7.3.3.1 of the NBAF EIS, the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative would use approximately 118,000 gallons per day of potable water, an amount that is approximately 0.76% of Athens' current annual average of 15.5 million gallons per day usage. The NBAF annual potable water usage is expected to be approximately equivalent to the amount consumed by 228 residential homes.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 21.2

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding human health. A discussion of human health and safety including the potential risk and consequences of an accident occurring at the NBAF is included in Section 3.14. The potential economic effects of an accidental release at the South Milledge Avenue Site are described in Section 3.10.9.1 and Appendix D. As noted, the risks are very low for accidents to occur that would result in an accidental release, and mitigation measures would further reduce the risks.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 15.2

DHS notes the commentor's concern. The number of short-term and permanent jobs are discussed in Section 3.10. It is expected that approximately 2,700 direct temporary jobs would result from construction of the NBAF, with many of the jobs being filled locally. Approximately 483 permanent jobs, including the initial 326 direct jobs, would result from operation of the NBAF, with much of the scientific work force relocating to the region.

Comment No: 5 Issue Code: 13.2

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding safe facility operations. The NBAF would be designed, constructed, and operated to ensure the maximum level of public safety and to fulfill all necessary requirements to protect the environment. An analysis of potential consequences of a pathogen (e.g. Rift Valley fever virus) becoming established in native mosquito populations was evaluated in Section 3.8.9 and Section 3.10.9 of the NBAF EIS as well as in Section 3.14 (Health and Safety).

Comment No: 6 Issue Code: 19.2

DHS notes the commentor's concern. An evaluation of the effects of the NBAF on quality of life resources is included in Section 3.10. A discussion of human health and safety is included in Section 3.14.

Comment No: 7 Issue Code: 8.0

2-88 December 2008

DHS notes the commentor's concerns about reliability of electric power to the NBAF. Section 3.3.3 of the NBAF EIS includes an assessment of the current infrastructure at the South Milledge Avenue Site and potential effects from construction and operation of the NBAF. No electric power constraints have been identified for the South Milledge Avenue Site. Should a site be selected for NBAF, any needed infrastructure improvements to ensure service reliability would be identified in accordance with the final facility design.

2-89 December 2008

Anonymous PD0023, Anonymous PD0023

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	PD0023
	July 24, 2008
1 25.1	I would like to register opposition to building a Number Four facility at Plum Island. I think there are still some unanswered questions that still remain with regard to the effect on humans and also I just feel that Plum Island is not a remote location as indicated. It seems like 1.5 miles from Orient Point is not remote. I don't know how that could possibly be considered remote. And also, I think that the impact upon the land beyond Plum Island needs to have a lot of questions answered about it as well with regards to airborne pathogens and their effect on humans. So, definitely as a resident of I definitely oppose building the Number Four facility at Plum Island.
	Thank you.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.1 DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Plum Island Site Alternative.

2-90 December 2008

Anonymous PD0024, Anonymous PD0024

Page 1 of 1

PD0024

July 24, 2008

Yes,

I'd like to express my opposition to placing this bio agro defense lab at Kansas State University; Manhattan, Kansas.

There are a number of geographic, geologic faults in the Manhattan area. There's one north of Manhattan - Tuttle Creek Dam - the east end of Tuttle Creek Dam is built right on a fault. There's several other faults to the east of Manhattan, the Lewisville faults and others.

The ground is not....the ground is not....presents a potential hazard for the lab, the large number of foreign students in the area, presents a security risk, I think, and this lab ought to be isolated not in a for example, where it's located now on Plum Island as opposed to the center of the United States where an accident or a rupture of the facility could contaminate thousands of square miles and result in the deaths of millions of animals and perhaps hundreds of thousands of people.

Thank you.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 11.4

Geologic concerns are addressed in Section 3.6 of the NBAF EIS. In addition, detailed geologic information would be evaluated during the final design phase of the project.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 21.4

A separate Threat and Risk Assessment (designated as For Official Use Only)(TRA) was developed outside of the EIS process in accordance with the requirements stipulated in federal regulations. The purpose of the TRA was to identify potential vulnerabilities and weaknesses associated with the NBAF. The TRA considered site specific data such as local crime statistics, diversity of the local population; including the presence of non-US citizens, and capabilities of the local emergency response organizations. The TRA analysis provided recommendations for the most prudent measures to establish a reasonable level of risk for the security of operations of the NBAF and public safety. Because of the importance of the NBAF mission and the associated work with potential high-consequence biological pathogens, critical information related to the potential for adverse consequences as a result of intentional acts has been incorporated into the NEPA process. The TRA and security actions that would be implemented based on TRA recommendations, are confidential due to NBAF security considerations. In addition, employees and contractors will be screened prior to employment or engagement and monitored while working, among other security measures as set out in Section 3.14.3.4 of the NBAF EIS.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 24.1

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Plum Island Site Alternative.

Comment No: 5 Issue Code: 19.4

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the potential consequences from a NBAF accident. Section 3.14 investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents, Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents,, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low.

2-91 December 2008

Anonymous PD0027, Anonymous PD0027

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PD0027

July 27, 2008

Hi,

I'm calling to express my concern and my opposition, my strong opposition, to the bio disease lab that is proposed for Butner, North Carolina. I believe it's NBAF.

That just arouses all sorts of concern in me. I worry about contamination to the area. I worry about people becoming ill here, people having to evacuate their homes. I worry about.... just mass danger really, to people. I also worry about what it will do to property value. I mean this is a booming area here near RTP, and people love to move here and work here, and property values have held steady here. And I foresee where this could have potentially detrimental effects on property value and that sort of thing. And I just don't see where....from the article I read in the Independent ...how it really would help the State of North Carolina enough to be willing to take on the kind of potential liabilities that that sort of facility in this area could bring.

So I just want to voice my strong opposition to it.

Thank you.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 19.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern. The NBAF would be designed, constructed, and operated to ensure the maximum level of public safety and to fulfill all necessary requirements to protect the environment. As described in Chapter 3 and summarized in Section 2.5 of the NBAF EIS, the impacts of activities during normal operations at any of the six site alternatives would likely be minor. Section 3.14 investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents, Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. Waste management (Section 3.13) describes the processes that would be used to control and dispose of liquid and solid waste from the NBAF, and Sections 3.3 and 3.7 describe standard methods used to prevent and mitigate potential effects of spills and runoff. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF then site specific protocols would be developed, in coordination with local emergency response agencies, that would address decontamination procedures.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 15.3

The effects of the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative on housing is discussed in Section 3.10.7 of the NBAF EIS. As stated in the NBAF EIS, the housing market would be able to meet the increase in housing demand (326 employees in total), relative to the estimated growth of the existing population between 2007 and 2012 (188,278). It is possible that with the relocation of highly skilled workers to the immediate area, property values could increase due to an increase in demand, and there is no empirical evidence that a facility such as the NBAF would reduce property values in the study area. Therefore, the overall effect of the NBAF on housing market conditions would be negligible.

2-92 December 2008

Anonymous PD0031, Anonymous PD0031

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	P	D0031	
	July 28, 2008		
1 25.1	I have lived in for 60 years. I oppose the bio safety Level-4 facility on Plum Island.	1	

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.1 DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Plum Island Site Alternative.

Anonymous PD0032, Anonymous PD0032

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	PD0032	Comment No: 1
	July 28, 2008	
1 25.3	The bio agro defense facility is not wanted in Butner, North Carolina. It will be deadly to the people and to the area, and the whole southeastern area.	
	Please no bio agro lab in this area. It is not wanted.	

2-94 December 2008

Anonymous PD0034, Anonymous PD0034

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PD0034 July 29, 2008 Hi, I'd like to say that I am not interested in having the bio lab here in North Carolina. Please reconsider and build it somewhere else. Thank you.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

2-95 December 2008

Anonymous PD0035, Anonymous PD0035

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PD0035 July 31, 2008 Yes, I am highly opposed to this facility being built in Butner, North Carolina. I think it is bad for the growth of this community. It could actually be of danger to the people. Thank you.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative. DHS notes the commentor's views on risk. DHS believes that experience shows that facilities utilizing modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF, would enable the NBAF to be safely operated with a minimal degree of risk, regardless of the site chosen.

2-96 December 2008

Anonymous PD0037, Anonymous PD0037

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	PD0037
	August 2, 2009
	August 2, 2008
1 27.0	Yes, I live and I feel it could to be located at Kansas State. It's wrong for it to be in the center of our country. It's not a safe (this phone message is unclear).
	Thank you.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 27.0 DHS notes the commentor's statement.

2-97 December 2008

Anonymous PD0042, Anonymous PD0042

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DD00/4	Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.1
PD0042	DHS notes the commentor's support for the Plum Island Site Alternative.
August 5, 2008	
Yes Sir,	
1 Ve live in the We do not need to have Plum Island ignored. It has done well	
We live in the We do not need to have Plum Island ignored. It has done well where it is. Keep it at Plum Island. We don't need it.	
Thank you.	

2-98 December 2008